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Evidence of the Need for Aggregate Litigation
Comment
by

T HEODORE E ISENBERG

1 Introduction
In the experimental game designed by GÜTH et al. [2007], player 1 has promised
to render a service to player 2. Player 1 either invests proper effort or shirks and
performance may succeed or fail depending on random fluctuation. When player 1
fails to invest proper effort, and performance occurs or not through luck, player 2
must decide whether to punish player 1’s nonperformance. When the transaction
fails, punishment may be sought through suing. When the transaction fails, player 2
may seek revenge or punishment though doing so incurs costs to player 2. The game’s
design resembles civil enforcement rather than criminal-type punishment. As the
authors state, “Note that we are not dealing here with punishment in a criminal law
sense, but rather with nondelivery of a service, which results in restitution regardless
of whether there is any guilt involved” (GÜTH et al. [2007, p. 145]). The noncriminal
nature of the punishment decision and the freedom to seek or not seek punishment
are both reminiscent of systems of civil justice.
The experiment may provide important results with respect to rational choice
theory and to evolutionary behavior. My focus is on the evidence the experiment
provides about individuals’ inclination to sue. This experimental evidence resonates
with real-world findings about individual behavior. The evidence also helps support
recent movement towards authorizing aggregate litigation in several countries.

2 Evidence that Individuals Are Averse to Litigation
An interesting result of the experiment is the generally low rate of claiming behavior, notwithstanding the fact that a significant fraction of nonperformance incidents,
about 25 percent, are attributable to shirking. For those participants without monetary inducements, the average share of players 2 “engaging in revenge” ranges from
0.056 to 0.081 (GÜTH et al. [2007, p. 150]). “As to participants in the investorrole, only one in each treatment and order is found to retaliate over all periods.
The percentage of those who sue at least half of the times is around 5%” (p. 150).
With respect to those in the possible suing role who receive monetary incentives,
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“[P]layers 2 who are predicted to retaliate do not act in accordance with their monetary incentives” (p. 155). I think it a fair summary of what the authors find to
conclude that punishment/suing behavior occurs at a lower level than expected.
This finding has important implications for civil justice generally and for civil
justice reform initiatives. It is especially important because it is based on findings in
Germany, as indicated below. The litigation aversion demonstrated in the Güth et al.
experiment resonates with other findings around the world. In the United Kingdom,
Pascoe Pleasence et al. report a “low rate of [actual – not experimental] respondents
acting to resolve personal injury problems” (PLEASENCE et al. [2004, p. 312]).
The action referred to is seeking advice, not even filing a lawsuit. The low rate of
action is reported to be similar to earlier studies of England and Wales (PLEASENCE
et al. [2004]). Most visibly, the United States is surprisingly nonlitigious. Professor
Patricia Danzon and colleagues found that “at most 1 in 10 negligent injuries
results in a claim” (DANZON [1985, pp. 23f.]). Professor Deborah Hensler and
colleagues reported a low rate of claiming for various accident types (HENSLER
[1991, p. 121]). The Harvard Medical Practice Study estimated “that eight times
as many patients suffer an injury from medical negligence as there are malpractice
claims” (HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY [1990, p. 7–1]).
That the Güth et al. findings emanate from Germany is all the more interesting
because, by at least one measure, Germans are among the most litigious westernized
citizens. In overall litigiousness, the United States is far from the leading country.
Professor Herbert Kritzer provides a useful summary of the evidence:
“On the litigiousness issue itself, patterns are not as clear as the popular perception might
suggest. In his study of law and disputes in Morocco, Lawrence Rosen observed that ‘one
seldom meets an American who has been involved in an actual lawsuit and almost no Moroccan who has not.’ My own comparative work on propensity to sue suggests that broad
statements about differences in propensity have to be conditioned by the type of issue involved. While it may be the case that persons in the United States are more likely to bring
claims and suits for personal injury, Britons may be equally likely to seek redress for consumer problems and perhaps more likely to pursue claims related to employment and rental
residences. Finally, the most comprehensive effort to compile cross-national data on litigation rates [see Table 1] shows that the United States is not the most litigious nation, nor is
the United States all that different from England and Wales.” (KRITZER [2002, p. 1981])

Güth et al.’s finding that German subjects are surprisingly reluctant to sue in an
experimental setting suggests that even one of the most litigious populations is, in
an absolute sense, not eager to commence lawsuits.
3 Coordinating Experimental and Observational Studies
The litigation aversion finding also provides an opportunity for experimental and
real-world observations to complement one another. Real world data from the several studies cited above strike the respective researchers as suggesting that citizens
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Table 1
Cases Filed per 1,000 of Population
Country

Cases per 1,000 population

Germany
Sweden
Israel
Austria
U.S.A.
UK/England & Wales
Denmark
Hungary
Portugal
France
South Korea
New Zealand
Ireland
Turkey

123.2
111.2
96.8
95.9
74.5
64.4
62.5
52.4
40.7
40.3
39.8
37.7
32.7
27.3

Source: WOLLSCHLÄGER [1998, pp. 587f.].

in a range of countries are less litigious than is widely believed. The new experimental findings suggest that the real-world observations are not an artifact of
inevitably limited samples or other limitations of observational data. Similarly the
observational data suggest that the experimental findings are not spurious. When
experimental and observational results support the same conclusion, the modes of
study support one another.1
4 Implications for Legal Reform
The experiment’s nonlitigiousness finding also relates to an important topic of
legal discussion across countries. Güth et al.’s work suggests that individuals with
righteous but relatively small claims tend not to seek redress. This creates a perverse
incentive for large institutions to try and extract a little value from a large number of
victims, knowing that retributive action is unlikely. It is unlikely both because people
are apparently averse to litigation and because the economics of bringing a lawsuit
for a small amount of money are unfavorable. One may not recover one’s full costs
even if one prevails. These facts support the need for a method of aggregating
a number of small claims into a larger economically viable legal action.
One such device is the class action. Evidence from the United States suggests
that class actions do deliver value to individual class members. As the size of
1 When experimental results differ from real-world observations, the researchers
should try to reconcile the findings (EISENBERG, RACHLINSKI , AND WELLS [2002]).
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the amount recovered by the class increases, the percentage of the recovery that
goes to attorney fees decreases (EISENBERG AND MILLER [2004]). Because of the
difficulty individuals face in using legal systems to challenge small deprivations,
other countries have enacted legislation facilitating group action against wrongdoers.
In 2005, Germany’s Bundestag enacted an Act on Model Case proceedings in
Disputes under Capital Markets Law2 which allows for “model case” actions for
claims “due to false, misleading or omitted public capital markets information”
or claims “based on an offer under the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act.”
Denmark,3 France,4 and several other countries have taken action with respect to
consumer class actions. The results in Güth et al. help explain why such consumerprotective legislation is felt to be necessary.
5 Conclusion
The evidence reported by Güth et al. shows how well-designed experiments can
yield results that directly relate to important policy questions. One challenge for
the academy is to assure that experimental results and observational results do not
sit in intellectual vacuums with no set of researchers knowing about the full set of
results. Each kind of work can take on added value in light of results from the other.
Experimentally-oriented departments need to strive to assure that researchers know
about related real-world studies. Researchers who use actual data should strive to
relate their results to experimental findings. The synergies that experimental and
real-world observation can yield when viewed in light of one another are obvious
but too often not explored.
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